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Note: The Minnesota Public Employment Labor
Relations Act of 1971: Another Public

Employment Experiment
I. INTRODUCTION
The Minnesota State Legislature recently enacted a new law
establishing a comprehensive public employment labor relations
system comparable to the private sector model. Since unresolved labor disputes are injurious to the participating parties
and the public interest, adequate procedures to facilitate conflict
resolution in public employment are necessary. Minnesota has
experienced political pressure for reform in this area since the
early 1940's resulting in a series of "experiments" in public labor
relations.
Minnesota's first effort to legislate in the area of public employment came in 1947 after failure to resolve numerous hospital
strikes under its "Little Norris-La Guardia Act."' The Legislature reponded to the crises by enacting the Charitable Hospitals
Act 2 which prohibits strikes by all nonprofit and government
hospital employees within the state and substitutes mediation
and final and binding arbitration as a means of resolving conflicts. This legislation, which has effectively prevented strikes
in Minnesota hospitals since its inception, has been a successful
response to the strike problem 3 and has demonstrated the feasibility of binding arbitration. However, the Charitiable Hospitals Act governs only collective bargaining within the state's
hospitals and does not apply to negotiations in other state institutions.
Subsequent legislative experiments dealing with other government employees have followed the pattern of most other
states. In 1951, following a Minnesota Supreme Court decision
which granted public employees the right to strike,4 the Minnesota Legislature prohibited such strikes and established an advisory impasse panel and a grievance procedure limited to "ex1. Minnesota Labor Relations Act of 1939, Minn. Laws 1939, ch.
440, codified as MmN. STAT. §§ 179.01-.17 (1971).
2. MINN. STAT. §§ 179.35-.39 (1971).

3. Report of the Governor's Advisory Council on Public Employee
Relations 25 (November 1970).

4.

Board of Educ. of Mpls. v. Public School Employees' Union,

Local 63, AFL, 233 Minn. 144, 45 N.W.2d 797, 27 L.R.R.M. 2293 (1951).
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pressions of opinion." 5 The 1951 Act was amended in 1957 to provide a broader "meet and confer" approach to collective bargaining and the settlement of grievances and to set up machinery for
representation elections.6 The Minnesota court subsequently determined that the Labor Conciliator, presently known as the Director of Mediation, could not initiate election procedures and
did not have the authority to determine appropriate bargaining
units.7 Thus the Legislature in 1965 formulated procedures to
follow in determining bargaining units and expanded the impasse procedures to explicitly sanction conciliation.s Since the
1965 legislation specifically excluded public school teachers and
subsequent court challenges failed to establish denial of equal
protection in this regard, 9 the 1967 Legislature enacted a separate "Professional Negotiations" statute providing for teacher
participation through a "meet and confer" approach and an advisory "adjustment panel" to resolve disputes.' 0
This legislation comprised the Minnesota public employment
labor relations system prior to the passage of the new law. School
teachers and other government employees were dissatisfied with
this system because they considered it inferior to the Charitable
Hospitals Act in the areas of union recognition, appropriate unit
determination and grievance procedure." Moreover, the "meet
and confer" approach and the impasse procedures were "generating rather than resolving disputes"' 2 because employee demands
did not have to be formally recognized and there was no final authority to resolve conflict. After the 1969 Legislature failed to
remedy the situation and following a devastating strike by teachers in Minneapolis, the stage was set for a major revision of the
Labor Relations Act during the 1971 Session.
The 1971 Minnesota Legislature enacted the Minnesota Pub5. MAinn. Laws 1951, ch. 146 (repealed Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 1971,
ch. 33 § 17).
6. Minn. Laws 1957, ch. 789 § 1 (repealed Minn. Laws E. Sess.
1971, ch. 33 § 17).
7. Richfield Fed'n of Teachers v. Richfield Educ. Ass'n, 263 Minn.
21, 115 N.W.2d 682, 50 L.R.R.ML 2399 (1962).
8. Minn Laws 1965, ch. 839 (repealed Minn. Laws Ex. Seas. 1971,
ch.33 § 17).
9. Mpls. Fed'n of Teachers, Local 59, AFL-CIO v. Obermeyer,
275 Minn. 46, 144 N.W.2d 789, 63 L.R.R.M. 2001 (1966); Mpls. Fed'n of
Teachers, Local 59, AFL-CIO v. Obermeyer, 275 Minn. 347, 147 N.W.2d
358, 64 L.R.R.M.2118 (1966).
10. AMinn. Laws 1967, ch. 125 (repealed Minn. Laws E:. Sess. 1971,
ch.33 § 17).
11. Governor's Report, note 3 supra, at 26.
12. Id.
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lie Employment Labor Relations Act 13 [hereinafter referred to
as "PELRA" or "Act"] on the last day of the 1971 extra session.1 4 The Act comprehensively revised the laws governing
public labor relations and, with the exception of the Charitable
Hospitals Act, repealed all previous legislation dealing with the
subject. 15 Thus all public employees, except personnel protected
under the Charitable Hospitals Act, are covered. The Act establishes uniform policies and procedures for all employees, with
several exceptions which recognize the unique status of teachers
and state employees. Accordingly, the new scheme is a comprehensive attempt to develop a bargaining relationship similar to
the private sector labor relations model. Despite the benefit of
providing uniform policies and procedures, there are many deficiencies in the new legislation. This Note will analyze the new
system, compare it to other state provisions and discuss desirable improvements. Although there are many technical difficulties with the new legislation, the scope of this Note is limited to a
discussion of the major substantive provisions of the new system.
II. ANALYSIS, COMPARISON AND EVALUATION

A. THE

ADMINISTRATIVE MACHINERY

The administrative structure for past legislation was skeletal
because the law of public labor relations was almost completely
self-executing and voluntary. The only state involvement required by law was the intervention of the courts who were responsible for the enforcement of the statutory provisions, and
the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Mediation Services, which defined bargaining units and recognized formal representatives
when disputes arose. Occasional interventions by the Director
of Mediation were short-lived and narrow. The availability of
the Bureau's Mediators terminated at the establishment of an adjustment panel,' and the services of the Bureau were not legally
13.

Minnesota Public Employment Relations Act of 1971, MINN.

§§ 179.61-.76 (1971) [hereinafter cited as PELRA].
14. A court challenge of PELRA is possible on the basis that it
was enacted on the same day the Legislature adjourned which may be
a violation of MniN. CONST. art. 4, § 22. In Knapp v. O'Brien, 288
STAT.

Minn. 103, 179 N.W.2d 88 (1970), it was held that any bill passed on
the day of adjournment is void. However, the holding of that case may
be distinguished on the premise that it applies strictly to the 120-day
regular session rather than an extra session convened under gubernatorial authority.
15. Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 1971, ch. 33 § 17.

16. Minn. Laws 1965, ch. 839 § 5 (repealed Minn. Laws Ex. Sess.
1971, ch. 33 § 17).
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available for school teacher negotiations. 17
In contrast, PELRA provides a more elaborate mechanical
structure. First, the duties of the Director of Mediation Services
now include the administration of a newly created Public Employee Relations Board [hereinafter referred to as "PERB"].
The Director is authorized to determine units, supervise elections,
conduct mediation and develop rules and regulations with respect to these functions. In addition, he is responsible for issuing
notices, subpoenas and orders, assisting the parties in the formulation of petitions, notices and other papers, and furnishing clerical and administrative services to PERB.' 8
Second, a centralized PERB has been established to administer PELRA_ It is composed of five members who represent labor,
management and the public at large and are appointed by the
Governor to four-year overlapping terms. 19 The Board is vested
with administrative authority to: (1) rule on appeals relating to
matters of negotiability, determination of bargaining units, definition of the various classifications of employees and the essentiality of employees;2 0 (2) approve rules promulgated by the
Director with respect to procedural matters, including conduct of
representative hearings and elections; (3) administer the various
arbitration procedures authorized under PELRA, including the
maintenance of a list of arbitrators from which parties to disputes are to select an arbitration panel of three members and
(4) maintain files of contracts negotiated.
Third, state employees are expressly excluded from PERB's
authority, and separate provisions provide distinct standards to
17. Minn. Laws 1965, ch. 839 § 7 (repealed Minn. Laws Ex. Sess.
1971, ch. 33 § 17).
18. PELRA § 179.71.
19. See Minnesota AFL-CIO v. Knutson, Memo. Op. No. 381711
(Dist. Ct. 2d Dist. 1972). Under PELRA § 179.72, the power of ap-

pointment and the power to fill vacancies originally rested with the
Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. This provision was declared unconstitutional as violative of the general principle of separation of powers embodied in Article III, Section 1, of the Minnesota Constitution.
In the alternative, Article V, Section 4, provides that the Governor has
the power to appoint "such other officers as may be provided by law."
Also, Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 1971, ch. 33 § 19(2) provides that if the
appointment procedure in PELRA § 179.72(1) is held invalid, such
appointments would be made by the Governor. Therefore, the declaration of unconstitutionality was not a surprise and caused very little administrative inconvenience in the implementation of PELRA.
20. The determination of the essentiality of employees is important
because PELRA § 179.72(11) allows the public employer and essential
employees to elect binding arbitration of the last best position variety
in case of dispute.
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guide the negotiation process.2 1 The Commissioner of Administration and the Director of Civil Service constitute a special negotiating team for state employee negotiations. The team may
negotiate statewide with employees in a single appointing authority (i.e., department) or, with gubernatorial approval, with
more than one appointing authority in a common proceeding.
Since the team may enter into only "tentative" agreements
which are subject to legislative approval, PELRA does not affect
the Legislature's legal authority to establish rates of pay and
fringe benefits.
Prior to 1970, no specific pattern emerged among the states
having public labor relations acts with regard to the type of
machinery used to administer the statutes. Although many
states placed this responsibility in a major functional department, such as Minnesota's Bureau of Mediation, or a special office within an existing department of labor and industry, other
schemes were almost as popular. Several states allocated this
power to the state civil service commission; others separated this
function among various departments, such as the state Board of
Education or local school boards in the case of teachers; still others created a new independent agency which was delegated the
22
sole task of overseeing public sector collective negotiations.
Since 1970, however, many states and the Federal Government28 have implemented an independent administrative agency
either covering all public employees or all employees with the exclusion of specific categories, such as firemen, policemen, teachers and state employees. Several states have agencies which
cover all of public employment, while many others exclude one
or more of the above categories of employees from the agency's
jurisdiction. Similar to the Minnesota approach, Connecticut,
Nevada, New Mexico and Rhode Island exclude state employees.

24

There are several reasons for this trend. First, the impartiality of the independent administrative agency is essential to
21.
22.

PELRA § 179.74.
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, Labor-

Management Policies for State and Local Government, Reference File,
51 GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE RELATIONS REPORT, [hereinafter cited as
G.E.R.R.] 101, 114 (1972).
23. Exec. Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R. 191 (Comp. 1969), as amended
Exec. Order No. 11,616, 3 C.F.R. 202 (Comp. 1971), issued August 26,

1971, effective November 24, 1971.

24. See Summary of State Labor Laws, Reference
G.E.R.R. 501-21 (1971).

File, 51

PELRA
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resolve disputes arising from election proceedings where several

rival organizations are struggling for recognition. Second, an
administrative board provides a recognized forum for hearing
and appealing complaints over such matters as appropriate units,
membership rights and unfair practices. Third, the agency may
successfully resolve disputes through use of its mediation, fact-

finding or arbitration procedures. Fourth, the agency provides
uniform and consistent statutory interpretations to assure equal
treatment among the parties and to relieve crowded court dockets. Finally, the agency may serve an information function by
gathering public employment data, providing technical assistance
in labor negotiations and establishing training programs for the
parties involved in the bargaining process. Lack of authoritative
central rulings dealing with these areas tends to place unreasonable pressures on the labor-management relationship. These
pressures are relieved when central rulings are established by a
group of neutral experts who can insure against bias and apply
their knowledge in the field to effect proper administration of
25
the statute.
While PELRA sufficiently conforms to the above scheme to
capitalize on the system's inherent advantages, it differs from
most other state systems in two respects. The services of the
Bureau of Mediation are retained, and the statute excludes state
employees from PERB's jurisdiction. Since the Bureau of Mediation's services were widely used and highly regarded under the
old law, the functions it previously performed--determination of
units, conducting of elections and mediation-were retained under the jurisdiction of the Director. PERB assumed most of the
new administrative responsibilities, so that a two-level administrative arm was developed under the -new legislation. This splitting of authority may be quite effective, especially in the area of
impasse resolution where it will clarify the roles and functions
of the third party neutral. On the other hand, the parties may
try to undermine mediation under the Bureau of Mediation in order to proceed directly to the impasse procedures under the jurisdiction of PERB. It is, therefore, simply too early to evaluate
this scheme.
Moreover, PELRA expressly excludes state employees, confidential employees, supervisory employees and principals and
25. FEDERAL LABOR
COmvimNDATIONS

ON

RELATIONS STuDY
LABOR-MANAGENENT

CoIrVTTEE REPORT AND RERELATIONS

IN

THE

FEDERAL

SERvicE, republished in D. WouLrr & D. SEARS, LABOR RELATIONS AND
SOCIAL POBLEMS, UNIT IV 39 (1971).
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assistant principals from PERB's authority. 26 This provision
raises an issue of the precise nature of the bargaining relationship between these employees and their employer. The authority of the Director of Mediation in this respect is unclear. It appears that the Director has complete authority over all such employees with several exceptions. First, depending upon the interpretation of PELRA Section 179.65 (6), supervisory and confidential employees and principals and assistant principals may be
prohibited from having their own appropriate unit in addition
to being excluded from other employee units. Second, since
PELRA Section 179.65(6) prohibits exclusive recognition for a
representative of such employees and since PELRA Section 179.71
(7) provides that only exclusive representatives may invoke
mediation services, it is evident that such employees are without
access to impasse procedure.
The desirability of giving these employees, especially supervisory employees, full bargaining rights and the fact that impasses will certainly occur in this area makes these provisions objectionable. The effect of these provisions on state employees
is even less justifiable. The only administrative machinery established for state employees is the procedures under the control
of the Director of Mediation. Thus, the success of their negotiations rests in large part upon the effectiveness of mediation
alone, which does not include fact finding or arbitration. This
means that the parties, upon failure to reach agreement through
mediation, must resort to other bargaining tactics such as strikes
and lobbying before the Legislature. Neither result is desirable
from the public viewpoint. Consequently, even though PELRA
establishes an independent agency to administer the Act, the exclusion of certain categories from the jurisdiction of PERB may
not serve the public interest. The Board should therefore be
given exclusive jurisdiction over all categories of public employees.

B. No-STRm.

CLAUSE

Previous Minnesota legislation specifically prohibited strikes
by public employees.27 A striking employee's position was terminated automatically by operation of law. 28 If the employee
26. PELRA § 179.72.

27. Minn. Laws 1951, ch. 146 § 1 (repealed Minn. Laws Ex. Sess.
1971, ch. 33 § 17).
28. Garavalia v. City of Stillwater, 283 Minn. 335, 168 N.W.2d 336
(1969); Minn. Laws 1951, ch. 146 § 4 (repealed Minn. Laws Ex. Sess.
1971, ch. 33 § 17).
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was rehired, he had to accept the same compensation, could not
receive a raise for one year, and was on probationary status for

two years.2 9 However, the striking employee was entitled to a

hearing before his employer to determine whether he violated
the no-strike law.30 PELRA retains the former provisions with
significant modification. First, termination is discretionary and
is effective only upon service of written notice to the employee.
After termination, the employee is entitled to a hearing consistent with due process to establish his innocence, as provided under former law.31 Second, the penalties are directed against the
striking organization as well as the individual employee.3 2 Finally, the only prescribed penalties include a two-year probationary period for individual employees and decertification and
loss of dues check-off for employee organizations. 33 However,
where an unfair practice by either party is involved, the court
34
has discretion over the severity of the penalty.
Traditionally, the government position on collective bargaining and strikes in the public labor sector has been a strict prohibition of both activities. The underlying legal argument originally was the doctrine of illegal delegation of sovereign authority. The public employer was regarded as an entity that could
not surrender its right to act unilaterally. Therefore, any agreement to negotiate or allow a strike was considered an illegal
delegation of authority.3 5 The courts have gradually eroded this
legal rationale with respect to bargaining rights. For example,
a recent ILlinois case recognized the bilateral right to bargain
absent a prohibitory statute.3 6 However, no right to strike in the
absence of an enabling statute has been recognized 7 despite re29. Minn. Laws 1951, ch. 146 § 5 (repealed Minn. Laws Ex. Sess.
1971, ch. 33 § 17).
30. Id. § 6 (repealed Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 1971, cit 33 § 17).

31.
32.
33.
34.

PELRA§ 179.64(2), (5).
Id. § 179.64(6).
Id. § 179.64(4), (6).
Id. § 179.64(7).

35. See Springfield v. Clause, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947);

Railway Mail Ass'n v. Murphy, 180 Misc. 868, 876, 44 N.Y.S.2d 601, 608
(Super. Ct. 1943).
36. Chicago Div. of the IlL Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ. of Chicago, 76 IlL App. 2d 456, 222 N.E.2d 243 (1966).
37. See, e.g., ALA. CODE tit. 37, § 450(3) (Supp. 1970); CAL. LABOR
CODE § 1962 (West 1971); N.Y. Civ. Smav. LAw § 210 (McKinney 1971),
as amended N.Y. Laws 1971, ch. 503-04. See also Norwalk Teachers'
Ass'n v. Board of Educ. of City of Norwalk, 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482

(1951); Board of Educ. of Community School Dist. No. 2 v. Redding,
32 Ill. 2d 567, 207 N.E.2d 427 (1965); Anderson Federation of Teachers,

Local 519 v. School, City of Anderson, 252 Ind. 558, 254 N.E.2d 329
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cent debate in professional literature concerning an unqualified
right to strike.3 8
The law at present acknowledges the right to bargain and
prohibits the right to strike.89 However, the achievement of the
dual goals of meaningful bargaining and prevention of strikes
in the public sector may at times be in conflict. This would appear to be the case where a union is forced to strike in order to
equalize bargaining power. The states have attempted to resolve
this conflict in several ways: (1) enactment of punitive statutes
similar to New York's Condon-Wadlin Act 40 which imposes strict
penalties on striking employees to deter future strikes; (2) providing a limited right to strike conditioned either upon the "essentiality" of the employee group (where a strike by these employees threatens the public interest) or upon the completion
of impasse procedures; 41 (3) establishment of balanced bargaining power through mediation, fact finding and arbitration' 2 and
(4) use of an unfair labor practice proceeding, usually modeled
after the NLRA. 43 The former Minnesota approach was the passage of a Condon-Wadlin type model, while the present approach
is a combination of the above measures, modifying the strict approach of the former punitive statute and excluding only the
limited right to strike.
Although PELRA does not recognize the right to strike, it
(1970); City of Alcoa v. I.B.E.W., Local 760, AFL-CIO, 203 Tenn. 12,
308 S.W.2d 476 (1957).

38. See Comment, 19 DEPAuL L. REV. 377 (1971); Note, 48 N.C.L.
REV. 992 (1970); Note, 38 FoRDEAm L. B.v. 801 (1970) concerning the
legality of the right to strike.
39. Comment, 68 MIcH. L. REV. 260, 269 (1969).
40. The pattern for punitive statutes was set by New York's Condon-Wadlin Act which provided for automatic dismissal of striking
employees and that any employee who was rehired could not receive a

pay raise for three years and would remain on probation for five years.
N.Y. Laws 1947, ch. 391, as amended N.Y. Laws 1963, ch. 702 (repealed
1967). The former Minnesota anti-strike provision is substantially the
same as the original Condon-Waldin Act. Minn. Laws 1951, ch. 146 § 5
(repealed Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 1971, ch. 33 § 17).

41. This approach has been recommended by the Kheel Report in
New York and various Governor's Advisory Commissions. See Kheel,
Report to Speaker Anthony J. Travia on the Taylor Law, with a Proposed Plan to Prevent Strikes by Public Workers (February 21, 1968);
Maryland Governor's Report, Governor's Task Force on Public Employee
Labor Relations (December 23, 1968), republished in 278 G.E.R.R. AA-3
(1969).
See also HAwAII REV. STAT. § 89-12 (Supp. 1971); PA. STAT.
AN.. tit. 43, §§ 1101.1001-.1010 (Supp. 1971) for recent enactments of
limited strike provisions.
42. See Section I, supra.
43.

National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964).
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is more desirable than the strict Condon-Wadlin approach because it permits a more flexible enforcement of the no-strike
provision. First, employment is terminated at the discretion of
the employer rather than by operation of law. Second, the penalties may be imposed against the employee organization as well
as the individual action and punish the procuring cause of the
strike. Third, the penalties are less harsh and may be varied
to fit the individual case. This approach is much more reasonable since the sanctions imposed may be tailored to the situation
in order to maintain the viability of the bargaining relationship.
This desirable modification of the traditionally punitive statute
recognizes the realities of public employee strikes and the importance of a good bargaining relationship.
However, it can be persuasively argued that a limited strike
provision should be enacted. Whether or not a limited right to
strike should be granted depends upon whether the imposition of
sanctions effectively prevents strikes and whether a limited right
to strike will promote meaningful bargaining without concomitant and irreparable damage to the public interest. Initially, it
can be stated that the punitive statutes have been largely ineffective in preventing strikes because despite judicial, administrative and legislative prohibitions, public employees do strike,
and the number of such strikes is increasing.44 Therefore, the
granting of a limited right to strike depends upon whether or not
the second issue can be answered in the affirmative. The reasons generally cited for prohibiting strikes in the public sector
are that (1) the sovereignty of the state demands the prohibition, (2) the essentiality of services is difficult to determine and
(3) strikes exert improper economic pressure upon the government.

45

44. See Note, Public Employee's Right to Organize, Bargain, and
Strike, 19 CATH. U. Am. L. REV. 361, 367 (1970). During the 1958-1968
decade the total number of work stoppages in public employment
increased from 15 to 254 while the number of workers involved increased from 1720 to 201,800 and the total man-days idle during a
single year increased from 7,510 to 2,545,200. Work Stoppages in
Government, 1958-68, Reference File, 71 G.E.R.R. 1011, 1017 (1972).
The trend toward an accelerated rate of work stoppages in public employment has continued since 1968. For example, in the field of public
education during the 1970-71 school year, 130 teachers strikes occurred
affecting an estimated 89,651 elementary, secondary, and junior college
teachers in 17 states and involving an estimated 717,217 man-days of
work. National Education Association Memorandum on Teacher Strikes,
Work Stoppages, and Interruptions of Service, 1970-71, Reference File,
71 G.E.R.R. 1051 (1972).
45. Note, supra note 44, at 367-68.
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The sovereignty rationale seems to be an insubstantial argument. Traditional concepts of sovereignty should not impede
otherwise desirable improvements in the public labor relations
sector.40 The exertion of improper economic pressure upon the
government is an argument less easily disposed of since it is related to the essentiality rationale. Together these reasons present a strong argument for a prohibition of strikes in the public
sector. Where essential employees strike, the economic and political pressure on the government is enormous since the public has
no recourse to outside sources to secure necessary governmental
services.
Since the only justifiable arguments in favor of the strike
prohibition are those dealing with the essentiality of the government service and improper economic pressure,4 7 an across-theboard prohibition of all public employee strikes may deny the
right to strike to some employees whose duties are not essential
but are analogous to those in the private sector, where strikes
are permitted. 48 Therefore, deprivation of the right to strike
without a valid corresponding interest based on the public nature of the job might be considered an unreasonable restriction
under the equal protection and due process clauses of the 14th
Amendment. Court recognition of a right to strike in absence of
a statute prohibiting strikes would be an important step in the
eventual acceptance of these arguments. 49 However, despite the
nonrecognition of these constitutional arguments to date, the inequity of the situation may presently be corrected by the legislative enactment of a limited right to strike. Since the state interest in protecting the public welfare may be adequately served
by limiting the strike to the essentiality of the employee or other
similar condition, there is great force in the argument that the
nonessential public employee should be given a right to strike
reasonably comparable to the private sector employee.
Furthermore, there is presently a political obstacle to recognition of the right to strike at a time when striking in the private
sector is under close scrutiny. However, political pressure was
exerted during the past legislative session for the passage of a
limited strike provision. The League of Minnesota Municipalities
lobbied to permit a strike at the exhaustion of impasse procedure
46. See note 76 infra and accompanying text.
47. Comment, supra note 39, at 273.
48.

Comment, 2 CONN. L. REV. 171, 184 (1970).

49. For a reference to legal periodicals dealing with the right to
strike, see notes 38, 44 supra.
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if the public employer determined that a stoppage would not
threaten public welfare. The Minnesota Federation of Teachers
would permit a strike after exhaustion of impasse procedure and
a refusal by the employing unit to agree to voluntary binding
arbitration. 50 Even though the 1971 Legislature did not adopt a
limited strike procedure, such a procedure is certainly a viable
alternative for the near future.

C. EXCLUSIVE REPRESENTATION
With the enactment of PELRA, Minnesota has experimented
with all common forms of union recognition in the public sector.
For all public employees other than teachers, former legislation
authorized both formal and informal recognition. Informal recognition had to be given to all labor or employee organizations
to enable them to meet, confer and communicate with the employer. Formal recognition was granted to an organization representing a majority of employees so they could "meet and confer" in order to reach a settlement for all employees in the unit.5
In the case of teachers, the employer previously was forced to
recognize every teacher organization. Where more than one organization was recognized, a teacher's council with proportional
representation by the groups had to be established to "meet and
confer" in an effort to reach settlement on conditions of professional services.5" However, the new Act provides for exclusive
representationfor all public employees based on a secret ballot
of a majority of employees in an appropriate unit or on an agreement of the parties after an "investigation" that indicates the
employee organization represents more than 50 per cent of the
53
employees in the appropriate unit.
Among the fifty states, the overwhelming choice is exclusive
representation. Only South Dakota retains the formal-informal
classification 54 and California is the sole state using proportional
50. See Report of the Civil Administration Committee, Minnesota
Legislative Subcommittee on Public Employer-Employee Relations, 196970 Interim, at 4 (1970).
51. Minn. Laws 1951, ch. 146 § 2; Minn. Laws 1957, ch. 789 § 1;
Minn. Laws 1965, ch. 839 § 2 (repealed Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 1971, ch.

33 § 17).
52. M nn. Laws 1967, ch. 633 §§2-5 (repealed Minn. Laws Ex.
Sess. 1971, ch. 33 § 17).
53. PELRA § 179.67.
54. S.D. CoMImED LAws ANN. § 3-18-3 (Supp. 1971), as amended
S.D. Laws 1969, ch. 88, § 7(3); S.D. Laws 1970, ch. 26, § 2; S.D. Laws
1971, ch. 20, § 1. Although the South Dakota legislation retains the
formal-informal classification, it is noteworthy that the formal represen-
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representation. 55 In the federal employment sector, the formalinformal classification was adopted for some representation functions, while an exclusive representation arrangement was in effect for collective bargaining in areas of discretion and policy. "
However, it is interesting to note that the federal system has recently been changed to provide for exclusive representation for
all collective bargaining functions. 5 7 Consequently, federal public employee organizations have generally been afforded rights
very similar to private organizations under NLRA jurisdiction.
The exclusive representation approach is drastically modified
in the public sector. The NLRA requires a majority of those voting in an appropriate unit to designate an exclusive representative, and provides for the preservation of the unit against attack
by minority representatives or the private employer."8 By comparison, the requisite number of votes in the public employment
sector is commonly a majority of those in the appropriate unit.
This latter provision creates organizational difficulties for the
public employee representative and also leads to successive elections where there is an insufficient turnout of unit voters. However, regardless of the problems with exclusive representation
as adapted to the public sector, this method is preferred both in
the public and the private sector.
The movement away from the formal-informal and proportional classifications is justified by the many problems related
to these forms of recognition. The formal-informal classification
apparently encourages fragmentation, confusing and overlapping
relationships, and undue administrative burdens. 9 Furthermore, with respect to the bargaining relationship, it has been
tative is the exclusive representative "for the purpose of representation
in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment." The formal-informal classification is now effectively dead in public employment.
55. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 3500-10 (West Supp. 1972); CAL. EDUC.
CODE

§§ 13080-89 (West Supp. 1972).

56. Exec. Order No. 10,988, §§ 3-6, 3 C.F.R. 521, 522-24 (1959-63
Comp.), issued and effective January 17, 1962.

57. Exec. Order No. 11,491, § 7, 3 C.F.R. 191 (1969 Comp.), as

amended Exec. Order No. 11,616, 3 C.F.R. 202, 202-03 (1971 Comp), issued August 26, 1971, effective November 24, 1971. For a discussion of

recognition in the federal sector, see Donoian, Recognition and Collec-

tive Bargaining Agreements of Federal Employees Unions-1963-1969,

21 LAB. L.J. 597 (1970).
58.

National Labor Relations Act § 7, 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).

59. Federal Labor Relations Study Committee Report and Recommendations on Labor-Management Relations in the Federal Service, republished in Reference File, 21 G.E.R.R. 1011 (1970).
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determined that unions with informal status lacked the strength
to contribute to stable labor relations.0 0 Proportional representation similarly has created myriad problems. In California, this
approach resulted in intense organizational rivalry and fragmentation and promoted extensive labor strife."' Minnesota's
experience with these forms of representation tends to confirm
the California experience. The results of such representation
have been bitter conflict among competing groups, confused bargaining positions, higher militancy and the playing off of one
group against the other.0 2 Thus, it seems clear that discarding
these forms of representation was a practical necessity.
The issue in Minnesota is whether exclusive representation
is an acceptable alternative. The Taylor Report in New York
found that exclusive representation has several advantages, including elimination of interorganizational rivalry, elimination of
pitting one employee group against the other, discouraging fragmentation of the employee organization, simplifying and systematizing administration of personnel relations and placing direct
responsibility on an employee organization for conduct during a
63
strike.
Nevertheless, recognition of an exclusive representative contradicts strong traditions of individual employee rights, minority
organization rights and civil service protectionism. The problems appear in much the same form as in private industry:
union shop versus open shop, individual versus organizational
rights and the employee's individual constitutional right to petition government versus the rights under the collective bargaining statute. Consequently, statutes which implement exclusive
60. Id.
61. Note, Collective Bargaining and the California Public Teacher,
21 Sz~x. L. Rsv. 340, 366 (1969).

62. In a position paper during the last election, Governor Wendell
Anderson of Minnesota stated:
Teachers' Councils set up by the "meet and confer" law divide
teachers and weaken their ability to bargain with a united voice.
As a practical approach to employee-employer negotiations,
multiple bargaining agents chosen by proportional methods
were rejected as a failure in the early 1930's. Such plans and
schemes were tried in a number of firms, and under a variety
of conditions, in those years. The results were: bitter conflict
between the competing workers' representatives, confused and
contradictory negotiating positions put forward by the several
employee representatives, a tendency of each competing group
to attempt to be more militant than their competitor, and the
frequent intervention of employers either playing off one employee group against another or making one group its favorite.
63. See Governor's Committee on Public Employee Relations, State
of New York, Final Report (1966).
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representation must simultaneously preserve the individual's
right to petition, safeguard minority interests and protect the
duty of the exclusive representative to adequately represent the
majority and minority. 4 For example, the Executive Order governing federal employment 65 and some state statutes have sought
to preserve the right of the minority representative to be heard
and to present grievances by utilizing the same pattern provided
by the NLRA where any individual employee or groups of employees in a bargaining unit have the right to present grievances
either in person or through representatives. 6
The recent Minnesota legislation provides a general standard
for recognition of individual and minority rights. PELRA recognizes the right of any employee or his representative to express or communicate a "view, grievance, complaint or opinion"
that does not interfere with the performance of duties or circumvent the rights of the exclusive representative, but does not allow the public employer to "meet and negotiate or meet and confer" with any employee or group except through the exclusive
representative. 67 This pattern of representation may be very
64. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 64 L.R.R.M. 2369 (1967);
PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE REPORT ON EMPLOYEE-MANArEMENT RELATIONS
IN THE FEDERAL SERVICE 15 (November 30, 1961); Anderson, Selection and
Certification of Representatives in Public Employment, 20 N.Y.U. CONFERENCE ON LABOR 277, 289-93 (1968).
65. Exec. Order No. 11,491, 3 C.F.R. 191 (1969 Comp.), as amended
Exec. Order No. 11,616, issued August 26, 1971, effective November 24,
1971, 3 C.F.R. 202 (1971 Comp.).
66. Anderson, supra note 64, at 292. The Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (a) (1970) provides:
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of
collective bargaining by the majority of the employees ... shall
be the exclusive representatives of all the employees . . . for
the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay,
wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment: Provided, That any individual employee or a group of
employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances
to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as long as
the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collectivebargaining contract or agreement then in effect: Provided further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.
67. PELRA § 179.65(1) provides:
Nothing contained in sections 179.61 to 179.77 shall be construed
to limit, impair or affect the right of any public employee or his
representative to the expression or communication of a view,
grievance, complaint or opinion on any matter related to the
conditions or compensation of public employment or their betterment, so long as the same is not designed to and does not
interfere with the full faithful and proper performance of
the duties of employment or circumvent the rights of the exclusive representative if there be one; nor shall it be construed
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difficult to implement. Since the Minnesota pattern of representation limits the rights of the individual employee and the
minority representative by such phrases as "interference with
the full faithful and proper performance of the duties of employment," "circumvent the rights of the exclusive representative," "meet and negotiate and meet and confer,"0 8 the exact
scope of the rights of the individual employee, the minority representative and the exclusive representative will be in doubt, resulting in extensive labor conflict. A more particularized or
simplified statement of the pattern or representation should be
considered.
Wisconsin, which adapted the NLRA system to the public
sphere, may have a better scheme. In Wisconsin, any individual
employee or minority group of employees has the right to present
grievances of any kind, provided that the majority representative
has been afforded the opportunity to be present and that any
adjustment of grievances is not inconsistent with the conditions
of employment established by the majority representative and
the state.6 9 This provision has the value of preserving only the
"inconsistent with the bargaining contract" limitation on the
scope of individual employee and minority union rights, while
allowing the exclusive representative the chance to be present
at all grievance proceedings to protect its rights by raising pertinent objections. Therefore this pattern of representation is more
simply defined in a functional manner.
to require any public employee to perform labor or services

against his will.

See also PELRA § 179.66(7) which states:
The employer shall not meet and negotiate or meet and
confer with any employee or group of employees who are at
the time designated as a member or part of an appropriate employee unit except through the exclusive representative if one
is certified for that unit as provided for in section 179.69, subdivision 1.
68. Id. §§ 179.65(1), 179.66 (7).
69. Wis. STAT. § 111.83(1) (1971). That statute states:

Representatives chosen for the purposes of collective bargaining by a majority of the state employees voting in a collec-

tive bargaining unit shall be the exclusive representative of
all the employes in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining. Any individual employe, or any minority group of
employes in any collective bargaining unit, shall have the right
to present grievances to the state employer in person, or
through representatives of their own choosing, and the state
employer shall confer with said employe in relation thereto,
provided that the majority representative has been afforded the
opportunity to be present in such conferences and that any
adjustment resulting from such conferences is not inconsistent with the conditions of employment established by the majority representative and the state.
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To properly define the role of the exclusive representative,
the role of the individual employer and minority unions must be
more precisely delineated under Minnesota law. Thus the adoption of a provision similar to the NLRA and the Wisconsin statute
would be one means to correct the prevailing weakness in the
PELRA pattern of representation.
D.

THE NATURE OF THE BARGAINING RELATIONSHIP

Minnesota's public employee labor law was formerly of the
"meet and confer" variety with respect to both teachers and public employers.70 The employer was obligated to meet and confer
at reasonable times in an effort to reach agreement but retained
final authority to implement the agreement. 71 Under this approach, bilateral contracts were not permitted 72 and there were
no sanctions for violations of the agreement. PELRA replaces
this approach with a system of negotiations which is bilateral in
nature and provides that both parties must meet and negotiate
with the intent of entering into a binding agreement. However,
with respect to supervisory employees, confidential employees,
principals and assistant principals, or their representative, and
with respect to professional employee's discussion of policy matters, other than "terms and conditions of employment," the "meet
and confer" approach is retained. 73 These relationships are implemented by a specified list of rights and obligations for the
employee and the employer under PELRA Sections 179.65 and
179.66.
Bargaining rights differ markedly among the states. While
there is a slight preference for requiring the parties to bargain
collectively, there are other approaches which rely on statutory
language such as "may bargain collectively," (emphasis added)
"required to meet and confer" and "right to present proposals."'7'
The choice has recently narrowed to the "meet and confer" approach and the bilateral "collective bargaining" approach of the
private sector modified to meet public employment needs. This
70. MINN. STAT. §§ 179.35-.39 (1971). In charitable hospitals, either the employer or the employees may request final and binding arbitration.
71. Minn. Laws 1957, ch. 789 (repealed Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 1971,
ch. 33 § 17); Minn. Laws 1967, ch. 633 (repealed Minn. Laws Ex. Sess.
1971, ch. 33 § 17).
72. OP. MINN. ATT'Y GEN. no. 270-D (Aug. 15, 1967).
73. PELRA § 179.66 (1)-(4).
74. See Summary of State Labor Laws, Reference File, 51 G.E.R.R.
501 (1972).
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fact is demonstrated by the stand of the Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations. The ACIR formally recommends
the "meet and confer in good faith" approach where bad faith
bargaining is treated as an unfair labor practice, but its draft
bills appear in both the "meet and confer" and the collective
75
bargaining formats.
While both of the above systems provide a continuing communication process and a definition of the bargaining relationship, a stronger case can be made for the collective bargaining
approach. Collective bargaining in the private sector sense may
be incompatible with certain established personnel policies, such
as civil service merit systems, teacher tenure laws and veterans
preference, which may place certain subjects beyond the scope of
bargaining. It further may fail to serve the needs of public employment where many services are monopolistic, since "consumers" cannot refuse to pay taxes for the service, and public employers do not have the option of shutting down services and
facilities. Nevertheless, a modified form of collective negotiation
is desirable in that it provides for bilateral rather than unilateral
determination of the terms and conditions of employment.
The proponents of the "meet and confer" approach, relying
on the concept of sovereignty, seek to maximize managerial discretion by stressing the differences between public and private
employment. However, the differences between public employment and private employment do not necessarily preclude bargaining among "equals" since a mutual obligation to reach agreement may be imposed in either sector. Self-imposed restrictions
in dealing with public employees do not necessarily impair the
sovereignty of the public employer 76 since the concept of sovereignty has already been modified by past practices. 77 The goal
in public employment is the balancing of management rights
against employee needs recognizing the basic difference between
public and private employment.
The Minnesota Labor Relations Act of 1971 establishes a
system that allows: (1) employees generally to "meet and negotiate in good faith," (2) professional employees to "meet and confer with public employers regarding policies" and (3) supervisory
75. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, LaborManagement Policies for State and Local Government, Reference File,
51 G.E.R.R. 211-22 (1972).

76. Id. at 111.
77. See Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1346, 1402, 1504,
2110, 2401, 2402, 2411, 2412, 2671-80 (1970).
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and confidential employees, principals and assistant principals
to "meet and confer . . . regarding the terms and conditions of
their employment.17 8 These provisions properly recognize bilateral determination of employment practice and policy, yet this
particular attempt to modify the relationship to fit the public
sphere may be criticized. Generally, government should bargain
with respect to its responsibilities affecting the "terms and conditions of employment" because such matters define the contractual obligations between labor and management as "equal"
parties. Moreover, the professional employee should be given
a limited voice with respect to policy matters outside the scope
of "terms and conditions of employment" because in such matters the interests of the government "financier" the public "recipient" and the employee "provider" must be reconciled.7 9
Generally, the use of bilateral bargaining should be promoted except where it would unfairly disadvantage the public
employer. The confidential employee, by definition, has access
to information that would undermine the bargaining relationship and should arguably have no greater power than to "meet
and confer" with his employer. However, the supervisory employee ordinarily does not possess such information; if he did,
he would be classified as a confidential employee. Thus, absent
proof that the supervisory employee's expertise places the employer in a disadvantaged position, limiting such employees to a
"meet and confer" role may be unjustified. Consequently,
PELRA should be modified to give the supervisory employee full
bargaining rights with respect to "terms and conditions of employment" comparable to other government employees and other
supervisors in the private sector.80

E.

UNFAIR PRACTICES

Although there was no formal list of unfair labor practices
under previous legislation, the following acts by public employers and employees were specifically declared unlawful: (1) engaging in a strike,' (2) intimidating or causing any employee
to join or refrain from joining a labor organization,82 (3) intimi78.

PELRA §§ 179.65-.66.

79. Note, Collective Bargaining and the Professional Employee, 69
COLUM. L. REV. 277, 296 (1969).
80. See Section G, infra.

81. MINN. STAT. § 179.36 (1971); Minn. Laws 1951, ch. 146 § 1 (repealed Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 1971, ch. 33 § 17).
82. Minn. Laws 1965, ch. 839 § 2; Minn. Laws 1957, ch. 789 § 1;
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dating or discharging an employee for exercising organization
rights 3 and (4) authorizing a strike or punishing an employee
for submitting a grievance. 84 Such unfair practices could be
enjoined by court order. 85 There were no penalties imposed
for refusal to bargain in good faith or noncompliance with the
terms of the agreement. The new law establishes an exhaustive
list of unfair practices by incorporating all of the above practices
and enacting others, such as blacklisting, refusal to perform services and unlawful picketing.8 6 The Act authorizes either party or any person or organization aggrieved by such practices to
seek injunctive relief and damages in the district court.87 The
Wagner Act clearly prohibited certain conduct in the bargaining
relationship.8 8 In the public sector, however, most state enactments establish the right to organize and join a union, to recognize the organization, and to permit the organization to enter into collective negotiations, but usually do not establish a list of unfair labor practices which might affect the exercise of those
rights.8 9 Where such lists exist,9 0 most restrict solely the conduct of the public employers. However, there is a trend to define
unfair practices for all parties in the bargaining relationship by
extending limitations to employee organizations and union members themselves. 91 In the case of unilateral negotiations, the
usual provision is a simple "non-interference" clause. The basic
purpose of such a clause is to protect employees from punitive
acts by employers or employee organizations " that promise not
to interfere with specified employee activities. Where a "meet
and confer in good faith" approach is used, "good faith" may deMinn. Laws 1951, ch. 146 § 2 (all repealed in Minn. Laws Ex. Sess. 1971,
ch. 33 § 17).
83. Id.
84- Minn. Laws 1951, ch. 146 § 3 (repealed Minn. Laws Ex. Sess.
1971, ch. 33 § 17).

85. MAnn. Laws 1951, ch. 146 § 4 (repealed Minn. Laws Ex. Sess.
1971, ch. 33 § 17).

86. PELRA § 179.68(2)-(3).
87. PELRA § 179.68(1).

National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-68 (1964).
89. Sullivan, Unfair Labor Practice Standards for Public Seruice
Employers and Unions: An Unfilled Need, 9 WAsHB. L.J. 412, 415 (1970).
90. E.g., CAL. GoV'T CODE § 3508 (Supp. 1971); CONN. GEN. STAT.
88.

ANN. § 7-470(b) (Supp. 1971); MAss. Gm. LAws ANN. ch. 149,
§ 178L (Supp. 1971); R.I GEN. LAws ANN. §§ 28-9.3-.4 (1968); VT.
STAT. ANN., tit. 21, § 1703 (Supp. 197-1), incorporating by reference
VT. STAr. ANx., tit. 21, § 1621(b) (Supp. 1971); Wis. STAT. ANN.

§ 111.84 (Supp.1971).
91. Sullivan, supra note 89, at 415. See also MAss. GEN. LAws
ANN. ch. 149 § 178 (1971); Wis. STAT. § 111.84(2) (a) (Supp. 1971).
92. E.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 3508 (West Supp. 1972).
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note the scope of unfair practices.93 None of these statutes specifies unfair practices as extensively as the new Minnesota law,
which enumerates various improper actions, especially with re94
spect to union practices.
It is usually recognized that bilateralism is insecure when
particular unfair practices are not defined.9 5 Failure to carefully delineate unfair practices produces no standard for regulating the bargaining relationship, which would have to be developed through case law. With respect to the public employer,
several additional factors make such a standard particularly desirable. For instance, specific prohibitions would define the limits of exclusive control and co-control. They would also define
the public employer's responsibilities and cause him to meet
them through public pressure at the polls and through elections.
These factors demonstrate the need for particularized unfair
labor practices which would outline the requisites of a proper
bargaining relationship.
Even though the unfair practice may not involve court enforcement, the mere existence of a violation of the relationship
as defined could generate self-compliance.9
With respect to the
regulation of employee relations, the designation of unfair practices is therefore essential to protect the employer, employee and
the public from expansion of the bargaining relationship beyond
its intended limits. 97 On balance, regulation of unfair practices
is necessary to insure the relationship will not grow chaotically,
to maintain a balanced labor-management relationship, and to
protect the individual from coercive action on the part of both
employers and labor organizations.
It is significant to note the approach of the Act to this problem. PELRA enumerates an exhaustive list of unfair practices
in contrast to a general "non-interference" clause. The specification of particular unfair practices is desirable to provide the necessary standards to guide the development of the bargaining
relationship. However, specification may also lead to rigidity,
inferential exclusion of other forms of conduct and serious legal
problems. For example, the classification of picketing, as an unfair practice 98 which results in a refusal to deliver goods or per93. Labor-ManagementPolicies, supra note 75, at 117.
94. PELRA § 179.68.
95. Labor-Management Policies, supra note 75, at 117; Sullivan,
supra note 89, at 417.
96. Sullivan, supranote 89, at 416-18.
97. Id. at 418-24.
98. PELRA § 179.68(3), (12).
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form services is arguably unconstitutional. The basis for such
an argument is that the prohibition of picketing violates the
fundamental right to free speech. It may also be attacked by
school teachers as a violation of academic freedom. Consequently, only future court interpretation as to content and severability can determine the practical effect of the Minnesota approach. However, the present list may prove to be too specific to
effectively guide the bargaining relationship in all situations.
If this occurs, the solution would be to enact a general "non-interference" clause to cover all situations.
F.

UmhT DmTT

vmnATioN

PELRA made little change in the definition of appropriate
bargaining units. In fact, only minor deletions and additions
were made in the prior standards used to determine most public
employee units. The only major change was the incorporation
of a separate standard for state employees.0 0 Several factors are
to be considered in determining units for all public employees, except state employees, including: (1) principles and the coverage
of the uniform comprehensive position classification and compensation plan of the employees, (2) the history and extent of
organization, (3) involvement of professions and skilled craft
and other occupational classifications, (4) relevant administrative and supervisory levels of authority, (5) the desires of employees and employers, (6) geographical location, (7) the recommendations of the parties and (8) "other relevant factors."1 00
Where state employees are involved, the Director of Mediation
must define appropriate units as "the employees under the same
appointing authority except where professional, geographical or
other considerations affecting employment relations clearly require appropriate units of some other compensation [sic]."""
99. PELRA § 179.74(4).

The word "compensation" in this sub-

division seems in error and should be changed to "composition" for
clarity.
100. PELRA § 179.71(3) states that the Director of Mediation Services shall determine appropriate units:
In determining the appropriate unit he shall take into consideration, along with other relevant factors, the principles and
the coverage of uniform comprehensive positive classification
and compensation plans of the employees, the history and extent of organization, involvement of professions and skilled
crafts and other occupational classifications, relevant administrative and supervisory levels of authority, the desires of the
employees and employers, geographical location, and the recommendation of the parties.
101. PELRA § 179.74(4). Apparently, the word "composition" was
replaced with the word "compensation".
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Therefore, the Act clearly gives the Director broad authority to
make unit determinations because he may consider "other relevant factors" and "other considerations affecting employment
relations." However, it should be noted that supervisory or confidential employees, or principals and assistant principals may
10 2
not be included in an appropriate unit.
The Minnesota approach is typical of that employed by other
states. Since fragmentation of units is the central issue in this
area, the state statutes may be generally categorized in the following manner: (1) statutes'0 3 establishing criteria such as departments, geographical area, or institutions which create broad
units (the most extreme example here is Hawaii, which includes
all employees throughout the state within specified categories,
including nonsupervisory employees in blue collar positions, firemen, policemen, and professional and scientific employees);10l1
(2) statutes using nonfragmentation itself as a criteria;'
(3)
statutes creating smaller units through "narrowing" criteria such
as duties, skills and working conditions of employees, history of
collective bargaining, extent of organization, efficient administration of government, and other similar factors' 0 0 and (4) statutes
102. PELRA § 179.65 (6). See Section II.A, supra.
103. HAWAII Rzv. LAWS § 89-6 (Supp. 1971).
104. HAwAII REM. LAWS § 89-6 (Supp. 1971) gives

the

complete

listing. Units (9) through (13) are designated as "optional appropriate
bargaining units." Employees in any of these optional units may vote
for either separate units or for inclusion in their respective units (1)
through (4). These units are:
(1) Nonsupervisory employees in blue collar positions;
(2) Supervisory employees in blue collar positions;
(3) Nonsupervisory employees in white collar positions;
(4) Supervisory employees in white collar positions;
(5) Teachers and other personnel of the Department of Education under the same salary schedule;
(6) Educational officers and other personnel at the Department of Education under the same salary schedule;
(7) Faculty of the University of Hawaii and the community college system;
(8) Personnel of the University of Hawaii and the community college system, other than faculty;
(9) Registered professional nurses;
(10)
Nonprofessional hospital and institutional workers;
(11)
Firemen;
(12) Policemen and
(13) Professional and scientific employees, other than registered professional nurses.
105. PA. STAT. tit. 43, § 1101.604 (Supp. 1972); VT. STAT. ANN. tit.

3 § 927 (C) (Supp. 1971).
106. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 1304 (Supp. 1970); Mo. REv. STAT.
§ 105.500 (Supp. 1972); NExv. REV. STAT. § 288.170 (Supp. 1972); R.I.
GEN. LAWS ANN.

(Supp. 1972).

§ 28-7-15 (1969); S.D.

COMPILED LAWS ANN. §

3-18-4
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establishing no criteria.10
According to this categorization, the Minnesota legislation
suggests neither a widening nor narrowing of units determination. In the provision generally applicable to public employment,
criteria such as "skilled crafts" would indicate narrow unit determination while others such as "desires of the employer" would
serve to broaden the unit. Similarly, appropriate units for state
employees will depend upon how "appointing authority" is defined and how the test of "professional, geographical, or other
considerations" is applied. Unit determination in Minnesota will
probably follow precedent where the Director has considered employer efficiency.10 8 Future determinations will also involve
employee desires and ability to organize. Therefore, it would appear that a "community of interest" standard will probably
emerge. Some of the factors considered in determining whether
a "community of interest" exists among the employees are the
manner in which wages are determined, the methods of job and
salary classification, interdependence of jobs and interchange of
employees, desires of the employees, the manner in which the
employer is organized to do the job and occupational differences. 10 9 In applying this standard, it is important to ascertain
if there is any conflict of interests among the employees in the
proposed unit.110 Public Employment Relations Board decisions
in New York involving this standard have led to the establishment of broader units. Thus a similar result may be expected in
Minnesota."'
The arguments for and against larger units are numerous.
The state employer has an advantage with larger units, which
prevent whipsawing and are easier to handle, because a single
union is forced to "manage" the entire employee group.1 12 On
the other hand, unions desire the largest possible unit consistent
with the maintenance of member loyalty and adequate representation of employee interests. 113 The individual employee

107. NEB.REv. STAT. § 48-816 (Supp. 1969); ORE.REv.

STAT.

§ 243.711

(Supp. 1971).

108. The text of past decisions by the Director of Mediation is pre-

sented in 378 G.E.R.R. B-8 (1970)

and 391 G.E.RIr,

B-4 (1971).

109. Klein, Unit Determinationin New York State under the Public
Employee's Fair Employment Law, 21 N.Y.U. CorNFCENc ON LABOR
487, 489 (1969).
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Newman, Major Problems in Public Sector Bargaining Units,
23 N.Y.U. CoNFERENcE ON LABOR 373, 376 (1971).
113. Comment, Determination of the Bargaining Unit Under the

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:134

would prefer a small unit which would insure adequate representation of his particular interests. 114 This conflict of desires
in a particular determination will probably be overshadowed by
another factor. Although large units have not always been succesful," 5 they may provide sufficient leverage to produce meaningful bargaining with a powerful employer. 110 Consequently, it
appears advantageous for all parties to initiate larger units. Thus
Minnesota will probably experience a welcomed broadening
trend in unit determination under the new criteria.

G. EXCLUSION OF SUPERVISORY PERSONNEL
The definition of "public employee" under previous Minnesota statutes made no distinction between supervisory and other
personnel. The term included all persons holding a position by
appointment or employment in any branch of public service.
Therefore, top level management personnel could belong to
unions, hold office and engage in negotiations over working conditions. Under PELRA, supervisory and confidential employees,
principals and assistant principals are specifically excluded from
the bargaining units" 7 even though they are "permitted" to join
other employee organizations or form their own organizations.
Such employees or their representative may be consulted by, or
otherwise communicate with, the employer on "appropriate subjects." The employer is obligated to meet and confer (but not
negotiate) with them regarding the terms and conditions of employment.'1 8
Whether or not supervisory and other management personnel should be granted the same rights as rank-and-file personnel
in bargaining is becoming an important issue in labor legislation.
The conventional approach is to make no distinctions among
"public employees" with respect to supervision or confidentiality."19 There are at least two reasons for such an approach.
First, the traditional definitions of "management" and "employNew Pennsylvania Public Employe Relations Act, 75 DIcm.
490, 501 (1971).
114. Friedman,

L. REv.

Unit Determinations by Mini-PERBs, 21 N.Y.U.
499, 512 (1969).
115. Sullivan, Appropriate Unit Determinationsin Public Employee
Collective Bargaining,19 MERCER L. REV. 402, 416 (1968).
116. Comment, supra note 113, at 498. See also Rock, The Appropriate Unit Question in the Public Service: the Problem of Proliferation,
67 MICH. L. REV. 1001, 1009 (1969).
117. PELRA § 179.65(6).
118. Id. §§ 179.65(6), 179.66(4).
119. Labor-Management Policies, supra note 75, at 105.
CONFERENCE ON LABOR
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ee" usually do not apply to the personnel systems of many
states, which instead establish grades of employment. Second,
many supervisors, including teachers, policemen, firemen and social workers, have a strong identity with the people they supervise. Several states, however, have segregated supervisors and
confidential employees for special treatment. For example,
Michigan's Public Employment Relations Act, which covers city,
county, and district employees, permits supervisors to form their
own bargaining units and collectively bargain with the public
employer. 12 0 New York's "Taylor Law" allows the Public Employment Relations Board to define " supervisory employee" on
a case-by-case basis and permits supervisors to organize and present proposals to the employer. 121 It is significant to note that
these schemes were established through administrative determinations without specific legislative guidelines. In contrast, the
Minnesota scheme provides a more constant statutory guideline
to define the role of higher level personnel and further provides
specific definitions for the various employee classifications while
limiting the bargaining relationship to the "meet and confer"
approach.1 22 The exclusion of supervisory and confidential employees from the rank-and-file unit is advantageous to all parties
in public employee bargaining. The employer today must identify the members of management and develop a community of interest with such people in order to achieve organizational efficiency. A supervisor's failure to act consistently with management interests can be corrected by establishing separate units to
insure that supervisors will uphold their responsibilities when
dealing with other employees. Moreover, when supervisors and
confidential employees are included in rank-and-file units, their
access to inside information may undermine the employer's bargaining position. On the other hand, from the viewpoint of the
union, higher level personnel cannot remove themselves from
management responsibilities, and the supervisors may act as
merely part-time advocates, resulting in intra-union problems.
Supervisors and confidential employees are nevertheless entitled
to certain employment rights which must be protected, such as
membership in a union or association and participation in employment policy-making.
120. See MICH. Cov. LAws § 423.213 (Supp. 1971); Hillsdale Community Schools v. Labor Mediation Bd., 24 Mich. App. 36, 179 N.W.2d
661 (1970); School Dist. of Dearborn v. Labor Mediation Bd., 22 Mich.
App. 222, 177 N.W.2d 196 (1970).
121. Labor-ManagementPolicies, supranote 75, at 106.

122. PELRA §§ 179.63(7)-(9), (14)-(15); 179.65(6); 179.66(4).
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The Advisory Commission in Intergovernmental Relations
(ACIR) recommends that the states adopt a statutory rather
than administrative scheme in which supervisors, elected officials, key appointive people and confidential employees are allowed to participate in unions and associations, but are prohibited
from holding office in, or being represented by, an employee organization of which rank-and-file employees are members. Instead, such employees should be permitted to join and be represented by their own organization and to informally "consult" with
the employer regarding the terms and conditions of employment
and other matters. 123 Although other state statutes generally
conform to this pattern, PELRA more closely follows the ACIR
suggestion by providing a statutory rather than administrative
scheme. The major difference among such statutes involves the
type of bargaining relationship permitted-submission of propos24
als, meet and confer, or collective negotiations.'
It is difficult to determine the precise bargaining relationship which the Legislature intended with respect to supervisory
and confidential employees covered by PELRA. The difficulty is
caused by the vague description of their bargaining rights and by
the need to reconcile the language "consult and otherwise communicate ... on appropriate matters" and "meet and confer
. . . regarding terms and conditions of their employment" within
the statutory scheme. 125 However, the basic thrust of the bargaining rights provisions appears to be the "meet and confer"
approach. To evaluate this provision, the desirability of limiting
rights to less than full collective negotiations should be explored.
The chief justification for limiting rights rests in how effectively
such employees may undermine the employer's bargaining position. By definition, the confidential employee has access to information pertaining to negotiations' 26 and can adversely affect
bargaining. Thus it would be difficult to argue that full bargaining rights should be accorded these employees. However,
123. Labor-Management Policies,supra note 75, at 105-06.
124. See Section II.D, supra.
125. PELRA §§ 179.63(18), 179.65(6), 179.66(4). Section 179.65(6) is
inconsistent with § 179.66(4) unless the former is read to pertain to

subjects outside the definition of "terms and conditions of employment"
as defined in § 179.63(18). If this is the case, then the Minnesota law
could allow "consultation" in addition to "meet and confer," depending
upon the subject matter in controversy. The key to the scope of participation by supervisory employees will depend on the definition of
"appropriate matters"

and the willingness of employers

sult," since consultation is not mandatory under § 179.65 (6).
126.

PELRA § 179.63 (8).

to "con-

1972]

PELRA

the definition of "supervisor" may depend upon characteristics
other than access to bargaining information or criteria relating to
the employer bargaining position. 127 Thus supervisors would
not necessarily have an adverse effect on negotiations. Under
PELRA, a supervisor may nevertheless be precluded from having bargaining rights comparable to other public employees in a
situation where he cannot substantially affect the employer's side
of the bargaining. This inequity is compounded by the fact that
supervisors in other states already possess full bargaining rights
either because they are in a state where they are included in the
appropriate unit as determined by local authority or because
they are given such rights despite being excluded from the non28
supervisory unit.
In view of these possible inequities, the Legislature should
consider separating supervisory and ordinary employees into distinct bargaining units while granting supervisory personnel the
right to bargain collectively. This is the approach taken in
Michigan under the Public Employment Relations Act in which
public employees engaged in executive or supervisory positions
are permitted to organize and bargain collectively through a
representative of their own choosing even though they may not
be included in a bargaining unit containing nonsupervisory employees. 1 29 This approach combines the advantages of separating supervisory and nonsupervisory employees into different bargaining units while avoiding the inequities of restricting supervisory bargaining rights to the "meet and confer" role.130 Consequently, Minnesota should consider adopting Michigan's approach to supervisory employees.
H.

THE SCOPE OF BARGA=nGc

Prior to PELRA, the law relating to public employees contained no specific limitations on the subjects to be discussed,
nor was there any mechanism for determining whether a particular issue was bargainable. The statute used the phrases "terms
and conditions of employment," "grievances and differences,"
and "grievances and conditions of employment." When broadly
127. Id. § 179.63 (9).
128. See note 120, supra, for the Michigan example where supervisors are excluded from the bargaining units but are given equivalent
bargaining rights.
129. Id.
130. See notes 119-29 and accompanying text, supra; see also Section lD, supra-
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interpreted, such phrases included everything, but when inter1
preted narrowly, the result was ambiguity and inconsistency. 8
One section appeared to recognize that matters requiring an
amendment to existing law or charter provisions were still negotiable. 132 Under the separate "meet and confer" law for teachers, negotiation was limited to "conditions of professional service," which was further defined as "economic aspects" of employment. The law required "conferring," expression of views
and exchange of information on all other matters.133 There was
no administrative mechanism to resolve such questions as whether a subject was "economic" or an "educational policy of the district." The only restraints upon bargaining under the old statutes were other applicable state laws, such as civil service systems, municipal charter provisions and the "management rights"
standard. These were incorporated under the doctrine of illegal
delegation of power, including purpose of the agency, standards
of service, methods of accomplishing work and the total budget
available.
PELRA allows public employees to negotiate "terms and conditions of employment," which are defined as hours of employment, compensation, including fringe benefits, and the employer's personnel policies affecting working conditions. In the case
of professionals, the term refers to hours of employment, compensation, and economic aspects relating to employment but does
not mean educational policies of a school district.1 34 PELRA
limits the scope of the terms by codifying the managementrights clause previously recognized in the case law,13 by prohibiting agreements which would violate any provision of law
or municipal charter, 3 6 by requiring that all contracts must include a grievance procedure which shall provide for a terminal
131.

Minn. Laws 1951, ch. 146 § 2, as amended Minn. Laws 1957, ch.

789 § 1, as amended Minn. Laws 1965, ch. 839 §§ 1, 2 (repealed Minn.
Laws Ex. Sess. 1971, ch. 33 § 17).

132. Minn. Laws 1965, ch 839 § 4 (repealed Minn. Laws Ex. Sess.
1971, ch. 33 § 17).
133. Minn. Laws 1967, ch. 633 §§ 1, 5 (repealed Minn. Laws Ex.

Sess. 1971, ch. 33 § 17).
134.
135.

PELRA § 179.63(18).
Id. § 179.66 (1). This subdivision states:

A public employer is not required to meet and negotiate
on matters of inherent managerial policy, which include, but
are not limited to, such areas of discretion or policy as the func-

tions and programs of the employer, its overall budget, util-

ization of technology, the organizational structure and selection
and direction and number of personnel.
136.

Id. § 179.66(5).
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step of binding arbitration,13 7 and by giving public employees
the right of dues check-off upon request. 13 8 Apparently PELRA
still relies upon the parties themselves to agree on the scope of
bargaining because no machinery is provided to interpret the
scope of negotiable items.139 The unique feature of PELRA is the
provision dealing with the area of policy discussion: the public
employer has the obligation to meet and confer with professional
employees to discuss policies and other matters not included
within the definition of terms and conditions of employment, including so-called management rights.' 40 The procedure for consultation on policy is a modified fact-finding procedure where
matters are "brought before consultants for their consideration
and advisory opinions" and a petition procedure is specified
14
whereby the consultants submit their opinions to the parties.
In both private and public collective bargaining, statutory
language usually defines the scope of bargaining as "wages, hours
and other terms and conditions of employment." 4 2- In both sectors, other tests necessarily have been developed to define the
scope of bargaining. In private employment, National Labor
Relations Board cases and Federal Court decisions have created
three classes of subject matter considered to be within the scope
of bargaining: prohibited, mandatory and voluntary (or permis137. Id. § 179.70(1).

138. Id. § 179.65(5).
139. Under PELRA § 179.72(7) if the public employer agrees to in-

clude a subject clearly outside "terms and conditions of employment,"
the agreement is not void, and only subsequent court action can relieve the public employer from the agreement. By implication, state
employers and employees under PELRA § 179.74(5) may agree to the
scope of bargaining subject to modification by the Legislature, which
is the final authority.
140. The first task in the policy area is to distinguish policy from
the terms and conditions of employment. Under PELRA § 179.63,
the latter term has a special meaning in the professional context. Consequently, the line between policy and negotiable subjects may be
different in professional negotiations as compared to other negotiations.
It is possible that the phrase "economic aspects relating to employment" will be interpreted more narrowly than "personnel policies
affecting the working conditions of the employees." After policy subjects have been designated, it is evident that the management rights
clause does not limit bargaining on policy. It has effect only as to
those items which are subject to the "meet and negotiate" (emphasis
added) condition of the clause itself. PELRA §§ 179.66(3), 179.73(1)
allow the parties to "meet and confer" (emphasis added) on "all matters not specified under § 179.63, subdivision 18."
141. PELRA § 179.73.
142. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (a) (1970).
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sive).143 Prohibited subjects are illegal bargaining matters, mandatory subjects must be bargained, and permissive subjects may
be discussed if both parties agree. Although this classification is
very difficult to apply and has been severely criticized, 14 Fibreboard Paper Products Corp. v. NLRB and its aftermath have es-

14
Typitablished guidelines to apply it in the private sector.
cally, as in Fibreboard,the private sector cases involve both the
duty to bargain in good faith and the scope of the duty to bargain where one party's refusal to bargain' 46 results in an unfair
labor practice charge.' 47 This classification of subjects is then
applied to determine whether the employer may be compelled to
bargain.
In public employment, the Fibreboarddoctrine has only persuasive effect.148 There has been relatively little litigation over
the scope of bargaining. Although some courts have used the
Fibreboardlogic, 1 49 most public authorities have turned to other
means to limit the scope of bargaining: (1) legislative enactments defining the scope of government power, (2) statutory
definition of bargainable issues, (3) statutory management rights
clauses, (4) decision by a neutral body, such as a regulatory
state agency, (5) relying on the agreement of the parties and
(6) relying on the concept of illegal delegation of power. Statutory management-rights clauses and the concept of illegal dele-

143.
(1958).

NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342

H. WELLINGTON, LABOR AND THE LEGAL PROcEss 63-90 (1968).
145. 379 U.S. 203 (1964). The Fibreboarddoctrine requires:
an examination of industrial experience to determine whether
comparable termination of work decisions are commonly discussed at the bargaining table, and on inquiry into the likelihood that the union and the employer can engage in fruitful
discussion of the problem.
Rabin, Fibreboard and the Termination of Bargaining Unit Work: the
Search for Standards in Defining the Scope and Duty to Bargain, 71
144.

COLUm. L. REV. 803, 821 (1971).

146. For example, by the assertion of a "management prerogative."
147. National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5), (b) (3)
(1970).
148. The National Labor Relations Act of 1935 and all but one section of the 1947 Amendments specifically excluded government employees from coverage. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (1964). The exception is
§ 305 which forbids federal employees from participating in any strike.
149.

In Tremblay v. Berlin Police Union, 108 N.H. 416, 237 A.2d 668

(1968), the union shop was held to be a permissible subject of bargaining by the New Hampshire Supreme Court. In Local 1226 AFSCME
v. City of Rhinelander, 35 Wis. 2d 209, 151 N.W.2d 30 (1967), the Wis-

consin Supreme Court held that grievance arbitration procedures were
a mandatory bargaining subject.
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gation of power are essentially equivalent to the managementrights argument employed in the private sector. 150 Apparently,
the concern in the public sector is "what is and is not bargainable" as compared to "what may or may not be required subjects" in the private sector.15"
Typically, however, the only state statutory manipulation is
the use of various definitions of bargainable issues and the specification of management rights. To manipulate the definition
of bargainable issues, some states, including Minnesota, define
the scope of bargaining differently for various types of public
employees. For example, the bargainable issues for teachers
may be defined as "salaries and related economic policies affecting professional service," while for other employees the guide is
the more common, "wages, hours ...
and other conditions of
employment."'152
In defining management rights in the public sector, most
states enact general statements of policy in contrast to the enumerated list of management prerogatives found in the private
sector. Both approaches have been used in the public sector. 153
It has been contended that neither manipulation is effective
where a strong union conducts negotiations, because the force of
counterveiling power may dictate the scope of bargaining by
agreement of the parties. 5 4 Where there is no provision for administrative machinery this is a definite hazard.
Management's policy determinations not related to terms
and conditions of employment have frequently been negotiated
as bargainable issues in the public sector, but cases and statutes
150. Management rights clauses are simply a formal legislative
specification of nonnegotiable issues, while the illegal delegation concept allows the employer to refuse to bargain because he cannot surrender his right to act unilaterally on an issue. This is a modified
sovereignty notion. See text accompanying notes 35-38, 46, 77 supra.
Where the "rights" clause cannot possibly cover the issue, the latter
concept may be more flexibly used to prohibit negotiations.
151. Kilberg, Appropriate Subjects for Bargaining in Local Government Labor Relations, 30 v. L. Rsv. 179, 189 (1970).
152. E.g., ORE.REv. STAT. §§ 243.711(2), 342.460(1) (1971).
153. IV.MosKOW, J. LoEwENBunt, and E. KoztARA, COLLECTVE BARGAn-NG IN PuBn.c EMPLOYN'T 240, 242-43 (1970).
Compare PELRA
§ 179.66(1) with the New York City Executive Order, The Conduct of
Labor Relations Between the City of New York and Its Employees,
New York City Executive Order No. 52, § 5(3) (September 29, 1967).
The former is a good illustration of the general statement approach
while the latter resembles the private sector model.
154.

Klaus, The Evolution of a Collective Bargaining Relationship

in Public Education: New York City's Changing Seven-Year History,
67 Ic. L. REv. 1033, 1066 (1969).
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discussing the scope of bargaining over policy issues are extremely rare. 155 Unionized teachers and social workers have
placed great stress on involvement in setting policy. This demand has become part of several negotiations' 51 where the public employer claims the issue is simply a matter of management
prerogative, while the professionals claim the right to represent
themselves and their client-the public. 157 Formal statutory
provisions have only recently recognized participation by professionals. For example, California and Oregon give the teachers
the right to "meet and confer" with local school boards concerning policy. While the term "matters of salaries and related economic policies affecting professional services" in the Oregon
statute' 58 may allow matters outside the usual scope of "terms
and conditions of employment," the California statute was explicitly amended in 1970 to cover "distinct policies on academic
and professional matter."'159 In comparison, the new Minnesota
statute goes much further. First, all professional employees are
allowed to "meet and confer" with respect to all matters not defined as "terms and conditions of employment." Second, a modified "fact-finding" procedure is established using expert consultants.
While a complete evaluation of the Minnesota provisions
must await their actual implementation, a tentative evaluation
may point out perceivable strengths and weaknesses. In the
area of wages, hours, other terms and conditions of employment,
and policy, the strength of the provisions lies in their more precise definition of the terms which were formulated with the
peculiarities of government in mind.
This precision is manifested in several ways. First, PELRA
explicitly authorizes bargaining over wages and hours, an area
which is often in controversy in the public sector absent such authorization.
Second, the Act recognizes the differences between professional employees and other employees when it defines "terms
and conditions of employment." It has been suggested that
"terms and conditions of employment" should be more narrowly
155. See Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employee Relations
Bd., 37 Wis. 2d 483, 155 N.W.2d 78 (1967); Note, Collective Bargaining
and the ProfessionalEmployee, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1969).
156. M. Mosxow, TEAcHERs AND UNIONS 215 (1966).

157. Id. at 181-82.
158.

159.

ORE. REV. STAT. § 342.460(1) (1971).
CAL. EDUC. CODE § 13080 (West Supp. 1971).
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defined in the professional context because the interests of the
professional frequently conflict with noneconomic objectives of
the employer. 160 Even though the practical effect of these different phrases cannot yet be determined, this approach is a viable
alternative to other suggested means for limiting the scope of
negotiations in the professional context which involve the difficult task of applying court-made distinctions.' 1 A separate system of case law can develop interpreting "economic aspects relating to employment." A possible weak point in the definition
of negotiable subjects is the phrase stating that the term "does
not mean educational policies of a school district." 162' Since the
section purports to define the scope of bargaining for all professionals, the phrase should be more general and not limited to
teacher negotiations.
Third, the management-rights clause is a good initial step in
limiting negotiations and providing for a degree of certainty.
While some general clauses are often so vague as to be of little
value, this clause enumerates certain rights making the meaning
more precise. If judicial interpretations are too restrictive, more
rights may be added to give the clause greater breadth or depth.
The difficulty produced by a general statement is that litigation
is required to ascertain its meaning and it may further disrupt
the bargaining relationship by preventing settlement of narrow
issues.
Finally, the consultation procedure precisely defines the role
of professionals with respect to policy. The inclusion of a test to
distinguish policy and "terms and conditions of employment" is
more appropriate than other legislation which does not furnish
professional employees a separate test.6 3 Traditionally, the factfinding procedure is used to determine how impasse was reached,
160. Note, supranote 155, at 287.
161. Several alternative approaches have been suggested in this
context. One approach would permit professionals to bargain over the
traditional labor issues only if the demand could be met by an increased
expenditure and would not require the abandonment of nonlabor policy.
A second approach would use the Fibreboard doctrine as in the Joint
School District No. 8 case, allowing professional employees to negotiate
non-labor policies, but limiting their role to proposing alternatives and
negotiating ways to mitigate the impact on the professional. See Note,
supra note 155, at 287-89. The problem with both of these approaches
is that they require a definition of non-labor policy in the first instance.
Nevertheless, the latter approach is to be preferred because it uses the
private sector guidelines to maintain a degree of uniformity and recognizes a conferring role for the professional employee.
162. PELRA § 179.63 (18).
163. See text accompanying note 134 supra.
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while the present procedure focuses on problem solving in a
policy sense. After some experience with the problem, it can
be determined whether the adversary nature of the proceeding
hinders problem solving. Furthermore, the petition procedure
assures that the public policy of "mutual exchange of ideas" will
be carried out. Possibly the greatest value in the consultation
provision is that it forces employers to meet and discuss, since
refusal to meet would be an unfair labor practice under PELRA
Section 179.68. However, the procedure will probably be invoked
only for important issues, because few employer and employee
organization budgets can afford regular consultation using expert
consultants.16 4
The issue-solving procedure incorporated in the new law is
an improvement because the use of the management-rights
clause clears the bargaining relationship of some uncertainty by
specifying certain issues that are not bargainable. However, the
statute otherwise provides no machinery for the interpretation
of the scope of negotiable items. In fact, the issue of what is
bargainable may be determined by the public employer in the
case of non-state employees and by the public employer or the
legislature if state employees are involved, rather than by agreement of the parties. Under PERB jurisdiction, the public employer may control the scope of negotiations by leaving the subject out of his final position. 165 Furthermore, he has the option
to reject the arbitration award within ten days. 160 When "tentative agreements"'167 are submitted to the legislature by state employees, there may be an impartial determination on the part of
the legislature,' 68 but this procedure nevertheless undermines
the bargaining relationship. What was lost in negotiations may
be gained by lobbying and political maneuvering. Although a
centralized body may lack the expertise to define issues for a particular industry, the determination of bargainable issues arguably should be left to a neutral body to provide for greater certainty and predictability in interpreting the scope of bargaining.
I.

LmPASSE AND GRIEVANCE PROCEDURE

Perhaps the most important subject in public employment is
impasse and grievance procedure, because an effective pro164.

PELRA § 179.73(5).

165. Id. § 179.72(7).
166.
167.

Id. § 179.72(9).
See text following note 21, supra.

168.

PELRA § 179.74(5).
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cedure can prevent crippling strikes. Under the previous Minnesota meet and confer law for public employees, the following
system was established. First, negotiations between the formal
or informal representative could be opened at any time. Second,
if an impasse developed, either party could petition the Bureau
of Mediation for help in reaching agreement. Third, an adjustment panel could be established to make advisory findings on the
request of the employer, formal employee representative or majority of employees "involved in the controversy."
The .panel was composed of one member selected by each
party with a third member chosen jointly; if no agreement was
reached, the third member was chosen by the district court.
Any employee was entitled to have his grievance reviewed under existing law or charter provisions and if none existed, it
would be reviewed by the adjustment panel.' 9 Teachers were
allowed to negotiate leading to an agreement over "conditions of
professional service" and to confer for the expression of views
and exchange of information on all other matters. Teachers'
councils consisting of five members had to be established by
October 31 annually to conduct these functions. If an impasse
developed, no state mediation services were allowed. However,
either party could petition the school board to establish the adjustment panel described above. The panel had to be requested
prior to March 1 annually and had to complete work by April
1. If no agreement was reached, the school board had discretion
either to adopt the panel's recommendations or to adopt its own
recommendations. 170 In contrast, the Charitable Hospitals Act
allows procedures similar to some private industries, including
mediation and compulsory arbitration. If an impasse persists
under this law, either party may invoke binding arbitration."'
The approach of PELRA is also unique in several respects.
First, the Act requires every contract to contain a procedure for
compulsory binding arbitration for review of personal grievances
and disputes over contract interpretation, using private arbitrators or those designated by PERB. 17 2 Second, the Act authorizes
the parties to utilize the services of the Bureau of Mediation at
any time.1 73 Third, disputes over the terms of proposed future
169. Minn. Laws 1965, ctL 839 §§ 3-6 (repealed Minn. Laws Ex.

Sess. 1971, ch. 33 § 17).

170. Minn. Laws 1967, ch. 633 §§ 5-7 (repealed Minn. Laws Ex.
Sess. 1971, ch. 33 § 17).
MINN. STAT. §§ 175.35-.39 (1971).
172. PELRA § 179.70(1).

171.

173. PELRA § 179.69(1).
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contracts, unresolved by dates specified in the Act, must be submitted to PERB for arbitration. An award accepted by the employer is binding on both parties. If the award is rejected by
the employer, negotiations continue. 174 Fourth, PELRA authorizes binding arbitration by PERB-appointed arbitration panels
at the request of both parties. 1'7 5 Finally, in disputes involving
"essential employees,"' 176 the parties may agree to invoke binding arbitration of the "last offer-last demand" variety, in which
the arbitration panel may choose only the employee's or the employer's last position in making the award. 1'7
This Act is the
first in the nation to recognize this type of impasse procedure.
All of the above procedures are tied to a schedule of dates designed to relate to the governmental budget cycle.' 7
When
agreements are reached, they must be embodied in a written
contract with a maximum duration of three years. In the case
of teacher contracts, effective duration must be two years.' 7 9
All types of impasse procedures have been used in the public
sector. Where public employees are deprived of the strike power,
a substitute procedure must be found to promote meaningful
bargaining while preventing strikes. Consequently, the states
have experimented extensively to test the various forms of impasse and grievance procedures-mediation, fact finding and arbitration. First, the use of mediation is widespread. A neutral
mediator is usually provided through a public institution to aid
the parties to reach agreement through various private means of
settlement, including the definition of issues and suggestion of
compromise solutions. 80
Second, fact finding has been experimented with in a number of states."" Usually either or both of the parties initiate
the process where a neutral fact finder determines the position of
the parties and then renders his opinion as to the true state of
174.
175.
176.

PELRA § 179.72(9).
PELRA § 179.72(10).
The essentiality of employees is determined by PERB.

See

text accompanying note 20 supra.
177.

PELRA § 179.72(11).

178. PELRA § 179.69.
179. PELRA § 179.70(1).
180. E.g., Minn. Laws 1965, ch. 839 § 3 (repealed Minn. Laws Ex.
Sess. 1971, ch. 33 § 17).

181. Connecticut, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York and Wisconsin have had extensive experience with fact finding. McKelvey, Fact
Finding in Public Employment Disputes: Promise or Illusion, 22 IND.
& LAB. REL. REV. 528, 531 (1969). See also N.Y. Civ. SERv. LAw § 209
(Supp. 1972); Wis. STAT. ANN.§ 111.70 (1972).
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the facts and/or the fair outcome of the dispute.18 2 Where the
opinion only includes the former, it is called fact finding without
recommendations, which is seldom used in public employment.
When the latter is included, it is called fact finding with recommendations and is frequently used to focus public pressure on
the parties to resolve the controversy. 83 The procedure is similar to arbitration except that the report of the fact finder may
be binding on either or both of the parties. If the recommendations are not accepted, the parties either resume negotiations or
the recommendations are considered by the final legislative or
84
budgetary authority.
Third, binding arbitration, either compulsory or voluntary,
is beginning to receive great attention in the public sector. Under compulsory arbitration, the views of the party are first solicited, then a binding determination is made by a group of arbitrators. The procedures vary from a strict labor court to the
use of the procedure as only one of the weapons to be invoked
during major disputes involving crucial services. 8 5 These procedures have previously been held constitutional in various states
when applied only to employment affecting the public interest
and where reasonable standards for the arbitrator's decision are
provided.8 6 Some states use voluntary rather than compulsory
arbitration where the parties involved in a public employment
dispute upon mutual agreement submit their disputes to binding
arbitration. 8 7 This approach was taken in New York when the
Taylor Report advocated voluntary arbitration on an ad hoc
basis to assure the "voluntariness" of the bargaining result 8 8
The states may combine any of the above approaches, depending
upon the needs of the particular state. For example, PELRA
182. McKelvey, supra note 181, at 530.
183. Simkin, Fact-Finding: Its Values and Limitations, published in

D. Woiarr & D. SEARS, LABOR RELATIONS AND SOCIAL PRoBLEMS, UNIT
IV 197 (1971).

184. McKelvey, supranote 181, at 530.
185. Zack, Dispute Settlement in the Public Sector, 14 N.Y.LF.
249, 255 (1968).

186. Note, Legality and Propriety of Agreements to Arbitrate Major and Minor Disputes in Public Employment, 54 CORNELL I REv. 129,
139 (1969).

Various states, including Minnesota, have upheld the con-

stitutionality of compulsory arbitration. See Fairview Hosp. Ass'n v.
Public Bldg. Serv. and Hosp. Emp. Union, Local 113, 241 Minn. 523,
64 N.W.2d 16 (1954); Comment, 39 MnN. L. REv. 322 (1955).
187. N.Y. Civ. SEav. LAW § 209(2) (Supp. 1972); NEB. REv. STAT.

§ 48-820 (1968).

188. STATE OF NEW YORK GOVERNOR's CoIIumTTEE
PLOYEE RELATIONS, FINAL RL.PORw 46 (1966),

ON PUBLic Em-
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combines mediation, a modified fact-finding procedure, and both
compulsory binding arbitration for grievances and voluntary
binding arbitration for impasse resolution.
Each of the third party intervention procedures discussed
has advantages and disadvantages. Mediation is the most tried
and reliable of the impasse resolution procedures. The skilled
mediator can use his neutral position to determine the facts underlying the issues and offer practical and face-saving proposals
of compromise. However, there are a number of problems with
this approach. First, the mediator can operate successfully only
when he obtains the trust of the parties. Second, the state cannot place mediators in all trouble spots, especially when numerous contracts are being negotiated during a particular period of
time, such as immediately prior to budgetary deadlines which
force settlement. Third, mediation is useless where the parties
have solidified their bargaining positions. 8 9 Despite such problems, PELRA cannot be criticized for implementing mediation as
its basic impasse procedure, because it is possibly the only fundamental process of social ordering which resists the rubric of state
power and authority. 190 The parties should be allowed to reach
a compromise before state power is invoked to force a settlement.
The mediator can be of considerable utility to the parties in
reaching this compromise.
After mediation fails, fact finding may be invoked. This
process provides added political pressures to force the resolution
of conflict. Since public sector bargaining must rely on political
pressure, the fact finder may disclose his findings to the public
and force parties to discard unreasonable bargaining positions.
The public employer is under the added threat of an illegal strike
when he rejects the fact finder's recommendations. However,
the fact that voluntary settlement remains open should not be
ignored; it is this feature that distinguishes fact finding from
compulsory arbitration. 19 '
There are several basic limitations on fact finding.1 92 First,
the effectiveness of fact finding is tied to the strike provisions of
the local statute. If the sanctions for striking are sufficiently
189. Gould, Public Employment: Mediation, Fact Finding and Arbitration, 55 A.B.A.J. 835, 836 (1969).

190.

See Fuller, Mediation-Its Form and Functions, 44 S.

CAL.

L. REv. 305, 339 (1971).
191. Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public Employment, 67 MICH. L. REv. 943, 966 (1969).
192. See generally Jossen, Fact-Finding: Is it Adjudication or Ad-

justment?, 24 ARB. J. 106 (1969); Gould, supra note 189, at 837-39.
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severe, a union is under strong pressure to settle the dispute
voluntarily while the public employer may be less inclined to
compromise. Second, if fact finding is to serve as an adequate
substitute for the strike, it must be made an unattractive alternative so the parties will reach their own agreements. 9 3 Third, it
is difficult for the fact finder to assume the role of a mediator,
gain the parties' confidence and then assume the role of fact
finder. The parties will feel confused and betrayed when the
fact finder employs information gained during informal mediation sessions to reach formal factual recommendations. Fourth,
the parties often complicate the procedure by making unfair
practice charges. Fifth, the process may become overly rigid in
the sense that mediatory skills of the neutral party may be
limited by the prospect of a formal report. The parties may
harden their position after the report is issued, and if it is rejected, any further mediatory effort may be met with hostile
criticism of the past recommendations. Finally, certain interested parties view the procedure as being inequitably balanced
in favor of the employer because the legislature has the final
194
authority.
Due to these limitations, some critics have stated that fact
finding is not effective in preventing strikes,0 5 and have proposed various alternatives including binding arbitration and a
limited right to strike.196 Other critics advocate less drastic
measures such as modifying fact finding itself. For example, one
author would have the fact finder's recommendation automatically become effective thirty days after issuance, except where it
is rejected in whole or part by the employer or legislative
body.197 This approach was adopted under PELRA where the
public employer must accept or reject the decision and order of
the PERB arbitration panel within ten days. 9 8 As a further
modification, PELRA separated mediation under the jurisdiction
193. McKelvey, supra note 181, at 542.
194. Wollett, The Taylor Law and the Strike Ban, paper delivered
at the Association of Labor Mediation Agencies meeting in Puerto Rico,
August 20, 1968, republished in BNA, PuBrac EMPLOYEE ORGANIZATION
AND BARGAnING 29, 32 (1969).
195. Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 67 McE L, REv. 931,
935-36 (1969).
196. See text accompanying note 3 supra, regarding the success of
binding arbitration in preventing strikes in Minnesota's charitable
hospitals.
197. Stern, The Wisconsin Public Employee Fact-Finding Procedure, 20 IND. & LAB. REL. REv. 3, 19 (1967).
198.

PELRA § 179.72(9).
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of the Director of Mediation from fact finding under the jurisdiction of PERB. This separation helps prevent the undermining
of the mediatory function, since the role of the mediator is isolated from that of the fact-finding panel. Hopefully, these modifications will be sufficient to overcome some of the problems
inherent in the fact-finding process.
Binding arbitration is rapidly becoming a popular alternative
to fact finding. However, since compulsory arbitration involves
several pervasive legal problems, voluntary binding arbitration
has been more often used. Compulsory arbitration can be a readily available procedure which assures the parties that any impasse will be resolved without interruption of the public service
and without the excessive cost of a strike. However, several
problems with this approach have emerged. First, the whole
process of collective bargaining assumes voluntary rather than
compulsory action. 199 Second, the parties may maneuver for a
better position in hearings before the arbitrator rather than engage in serious collective bargaining. 20 0 Third, compulsory arbitration guarantees neither compliance with the no-strike provision nor with the award of the arbitrator. Therefore, the decision of the arbitrator may only be a springboard to further
negotiation. Finally, the arbitrator may be a government employee who serves as a protector of the public interest and is extremely sensitive to legislative and public pressures. These
problems have usually been overlooked in the area of grievance
arbitration. Compulsory grievance arbitration is frequently used
in this area because it is better to have consistency in application
of punitive measures and contract interpretation than to allow
compromise solutions.
Some of the above problems are solved by utilizing voluntary binding arbitration. This form of arbitration is more consistent with the policy of independence and freedom in labor
relations. Also, because the arbitrator is usually not connected
with the government, the equities of all the parties will be considered rather than making a determination solely on the basis
of the public ability to pay.
199.

Zack, supra note 185, at 258.

200.

Id. at 259.

In private employment grievance arbitration, the

evidence shows that the parties tend to hold back the strong points of
their case until the case is brought before the arbitrator. This tactic
is especially prevalent where new contract terms are being interpreted.
See Note, Legality and Propriety of Agreements to Arbitrate Major
and Minor Disputes in Public Employment, 54 CORNELL L. REV. 129,

142 (1969).
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However, some practical and legal problems still remain unsolved. First, because the process is voluntary, it might not be
implemented. Furthermore, even if it is used, the parties might
not comply with the award. The union may strike and the employer may refuse to appropriate funds. Second, there are grave
constitutional issues: It is at least arguable that a delegation of
power to the executive or a private citizen group violates the
doctrine of delegation of legislative powers and that the executive exceeds his power by delegating authority to an arbitrator.
It is also unclear what checks and balances are operative in the
constitutional framework to protect the parties from arbitrary
action. Apparently the constitutional problems are not insurmountable, especially in the area of voluntary binding arbitration, if an adequate standard to guide the arbitrator in his decision is established in the enabling legislation.2 0 Third, permitting an arbitrator to determine rates for an isolated segment of
public employment may tend to have a whipsawing effect on negotiations with other public employees, forcing further arbitration to resolve wage inequities. 2 0 2 Consequently, even though
voluntary binding arbitration is not a panacea, it does provide a
reasonably trouble-free means to resolve impasses.
Under PELRA, parties wishing to forego fact finding may
initiate voluntary binding arbitration and, in the case of "essential" employees, may initiate voluntary binding arbitration of the
"last offer-last demand" variety.20 3

The value of this type of

arbitration is more speculative because the public sector has had
no experience with it. This form of arbitration will probably
force the parties to take more reasonable positions when the issue
is placed before the arbitrator since an unreasonable stand will
automatically be rejected in favor of the other party. Moreover,
because of the all or nothing nature of the result, the parties
have an incentive to reach agreement before submission to the
arbitrator. However, these benefits are not gained without cost:
201. Zack, supra note 185, at 265-66; Warwick v. Regular Firemen's
Ass'n, 106 R.L 109, 71 L.R.R.ML 3192 (1969); Fairview Hosp. Ass'n v.

Public Bldg. Serv. and Hosp. Emp. Union, Local 113, 241 Minn. 523,
64 N.W.2d 16 (1954); New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. Communication

Workers, 5 N.J. 354, 75 A.2d 721 (1950); West Hartford Educ. Ass'n v.

-Board of Educ., Memo

Op. No. 153716,

68 L.R.R.M.

2371

(Com.

Super. Ct., Hartford Cty., 1968).
202. Address by George W. Taylor at the Governor's Conference on
Public Employment Relations, New York City, Oct. 15, 1968, published

in H.

ROBERTS, LABOR-MANAGEMENT

458, 460 (1970).

203. PELRA § 179.72(9), (10).
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if the matter is arbitrated, the all or nothing nature of the outcome may force the losing party into noncompliance and the use
of other tactics, including the strike.
Under PELRA there are two additional problems. First, the
statute does not clearly define the position of the parties if they
do not choose to invoke "last offer-last demand" arbitration.
Since the section dealing with voluntary arbitration expressly
excludes essential employees, 20 4 the section describing the procedure for such employees refers to the fact-finding section. 200
Since the principle of in pari materia compels a relationship
among the arbitration sections, 20 6 fact finding will probably be
interpreted as the alternative procedure. This result may be
desirable depending upon whether the "last offer-last demand"
procedure proves successful. If either party is dissatisfied with
and continually rejects this procedure, the only alternative available in an essential section of the economy will be fact findinga procedure that has had very limited success in preventing
strikes.

207

Second, PELRA incorporates a time schedule for bargaining
tied to the budget deadline. While this provision has the advantageous goal of systematizing the bargaining relationship and
providing orderly administrative practice, experience in Pennsylvania and New York 20 8 has shown that problems may emerge
when strict adherence to a schedule is attempted. For example,
the parties might use various delaying tactics to postpone settlement beyond the bargaining deadlines when trend-setting, comparison negotiations have not been completed. Although such
tactics risk an unfair labor practice charge, there does not appear
to be an otherwise appropriate enforcement mechanism, such as
punitive damages or government coercion, built into the structure of PELRA to insure compliance with the time schedule.
204.
205.
206.

PELRA § 179.72(9).
PELRA § 179.72(10).
PELRA § 179.72(8)-(10).

207. Kheel, supra note 195, at 935-36.
208.

See City of Schenectady v. Helsby, 57 Misc. 2d 91, 93-94, 292

N.Y.S.2d 141, 145 (Sup. Ct. 1968).

In a lower court decision, the court

held that budgetary deadlines under N.Y. Cirv. SERv. LAw § 209(3)

(c) - (e) (1967) need not be strictly observed. The City of Schenectady
brought an action to enjoin the appointment of a fact finder, contending that his appointment after the budget submission date was illegal.
The court held that the statutory definition of "impasse" pursuant to
§ 209 (1) (where an impasse was defined as a failure to achieve agreement 60 days prior to the budget submission date of the public employer) must give way to the spirit of the law to allow PERB to render
assistance.
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Despite these two problems, the general area of grievance
and impasse procedure seems quite realistic in approach. There
is a logical progression from mediation conducted by the Director
of Mediation to fact finding and binding arbitration under the
jurisdiction of PERB. These procedures are tied to a time-table
designed to effect agreement before the budget deadline. This
scheme is conceptually attractive because it allows the parties
to negotiate freely, allowing progressively more compulsive third
party presence as negotiations continue to deadlock and simultaneously recognizes traditional independence and freedom of
choice in bargaining. However, the real test will be whether it
is successful in preventing strikes. If PELRA's procedures cannot meet this test, the alternative procedures of compulsory
binding arbitration patterned after the Charitable Hospitals Act
and the limited right to strike should be seriously considered.
While the coercive nature of compulsory binding arbitration may
be less desirable compared to the strike provision, its limited use
in essential services may be justified.
III. CONCLUSION
It is almost impossible to generalize from the myriad state
laws concerning public employment labor relations. Each state
is conducting its own experiment, so they are characterized by
endless variety. The universal prohibition of strikes ended with
the enactment of limited strike provisions in Hawaii and Pennsylvania, but may be replaced with a universal provision for exclusive representation. Even these so-called universals are subject to change and exception. Each state is trying to find the
system that works best under local conditions. Some highly industrialized states having broad experience with labor negotiations require comprehensive legislation. Other states having
only limited experience in public negotiations need no law at all.
With the passage of the Public Employment Labor Relations
Act, Minnesota has joined the former group. PELRA develops a
bargaining system which closely resembles labor relations in the
private sector by providing a comprehensive system with uniform policies and procedures. The system is modified to serve
the needs of public employment and particular classifications of
employees, as in the establishment of a policy consultation procedure for professional employees. These features will allow the
development of meaningful bargaining relationships in the public sector,
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However, PELRA has many substantive and technical difficulties which require a characterization of the bill as being only
a good first step in legislation. For example, PERB's jurisdiction
should be extended to include state employees; a limited strike
provision should be considered; individual, minority representative, and exclusive representative rights in bargaining should be
legislated; more general unfair practices, allowing flexible court
interpretation may be advisable; depending upon the interpretations of the Director under present criteria, the criteria for determining bargaining units should be broadened; certain classes
of supervisors should be given full bargaining rights; a more
specific list of management rights along with independent agency interpretation of bargainable issues would make the scope of
bargaining more predictable; and an effective enforcement mechanism to force the parties to adhere to the bargaining time-table
should be enacted.
Many other problems are certain to emerge under the new
legislation. For example, the scope of the definition of "state
employees" must be more precisely defined. Where the civil
service and negotiated grievance procedure co-exist, the priority
for specified issues must be determined. It also must be determined whether there should be a formal recognition of closed,
union or agency shops in public employment. Separate treatment of hospital employees is arguably a denial of equal protection within the new context of public employment labor relations. The conflict between individual teacher contracts and collective bargaining agreements for teacher organizations must also be resolved. All of these problems are certain to emerge within the framework of the new law. In recognition of the above
deficiencies, the 1973 Minnesota State Legislature will probably
have to engage in further experimentation in public employment
labor legislation.

